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EDITORS’ INTRODUCTION
Michael O’Neill Burns & Brian Anthony Smith
University of  Dundee
The present issue is a collection of essays inspired by a conference which took place in 
March 2010 at the University of Dundee entitled, ‘Real Objects or Material Subjects?’ 
While some of the essays in this issue are extensions of papers presented at the conference, 
others are original pieces inspired by the event. Although the essays contained in this 
issue cover topics ranging from psychoanalysis, contemporary French metaphysics, 
the re-appropriation of German Idealism for twenty-first century philosophy, to object 
centered approaches to metaphysics; they all share one thing in common: a concern with 
exploring the future of speculative metaphysics in the context of twenty-first century 
European philosophy. In particular, these essays, and the conference that inspired 
them, critically explore two growing sensibilities in continental metaphysics: materialist 
accounts of subjectivity and realist accounts of objects. 
The object oriented approach to philosophical realism is a recent philosophical 
movement inspired primarily by the work of Graham Harman, and recently taken up 
by philosophers and theorists such as Levi Bryant, Timothy Morton, Steven Shaviro, 
and Ian Bogost. Materialist accounts of subjectivity, or transcendental materialism, are 
a sensibility first articulated by Adrian Johnston in his systematic reading of the work of 
Slavoj Žižek, which can equally describe aspects of the projects of figures such as Alain 
Badiou, Catherine Malabou, and Quentin Meillassoux. One thing in common to both 
of these movements is a renewed emphasis on the speculative aspect of philosophy, and 
by this we mean the attempt of philosophical speculation to move past the bounds of 
the human-world correlate and ‘think’ the absolute in-itself. The common reference 
for both movements on this point is the argument against correlationism presented in 
Quentin Meillassoux’s After Finitude, a work that serves as a point of reference for many 
of the papers contained in this issue.1 Meillassoux relies on the argument that post-Kan-
tian philosophy has been largely trapped within the bounds of strong correlationism, 
meaning that any account of the existence of an object or entity is necessarily correla-
     1. In particular see the contributions in the present volume by Paul J. Ennis and John Van Houdt. 
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tive to its being perceived by a conscious subject. Meillassoux problematizes correla-
tionism through his employment of the concept of the arche-fossil, which signifies any 
object whose existence pre-dates the emergences of human consciousness. The question 
arising from this example is how is it possible for us to affirm the existence of these iso-
topes while acknowledging that they existed before the possibility of any subject-object 
correlation. 
In order to understand Harman’s object oriented philosophy, and the more general 
position of object oriented ontology (OOO), it is important to understand how these 
approaches differ from other recent forms of continental realist metaphysics. Deleuze 
stands as a key figure for certain materialist strands of continental philosophy, in partic-
ular the realist interpretations of DeLanda and John Protevi’s more political approach. 
The theme that dominates these particular appropriations of Deleuze is the concept of 
self-organizing systems and autopoesis. In these ontologies of flux and becoming objects 
tend to be thought of in terms of autopoetic homeostatic systems, maintaining a dy-
namic identity through self regulation. As such, these objects have no intrinsic identity 
as they come into being and pass away. For example, DeLanda sees a species as a finite 
being as much as any individual organism, the difference rests only on the timescale on 
which they are considered.2 
Harman thinks that this tendency, found in thinkers such as Deleuze, Latour and 
Whitehead, inevitably reduces objects to their relations.3 This is problematic as such re-
lational theories have trouble accounting for change in the object itself, and their deter-
mination of objects tend to be retrospective; pointing out the thing after it has come into 
being, rather than accounting for its emergence. Towards the end of Prince of  Networks, 
Harman insists that to overcome these problems we need a theory of objects that holds 
something in reserve:
Unless the thing holds something in reserve behind its current relations, nothing 
would ever change. This secret reservoir cannot be the ‘potential’, because the 
potential needs to be inscribed somewhere actual right now, and if the actual is 
entirely determined by its relations then this gets us nowhere. And the reserve 
also cannot be called the ‘virtual’, since this term merely plays the double game of 
continuous and heterogeneous.4
The positing of such a radical non-relational interiority to objects leads to a massive on-
tological inflation and flattening. The incongruous and unconnected lists of things that 
can count as objects reflects this lack of hierarchy, leading to a situation where a rock, 
animal, number or fictional character are all equally objects, with their own withdrawn 
non-relational interior. This inflation of objects along with the flattening of any ontologi-
cal hierarchy is, for Harman and other OOO philosophers, a desirable trait necessary 
in order to break the bonds of strong correlationism. The non-relational interiority is 
not an abstracted form of consciousness, an elevation of consciousness to a form of pan-
     2. DeLanda, Manuel, Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy, London, Continuum, 2004, p. 39.
     3. Harman, Graham, Prince of  Networks: Bruno Latour and Metaphysics, Melbourne, re:press, 2009, pp. 6, 187.
     4. Ibid. p. 187.
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psychism, nor is it a materialist reduction, which would rely too much on a pre-given 
theoretical framework. The non-conscious independence of objects, whether they are 
material, ideal, scientific or fictional, deals a blow to any privileged, and in particular 
conscious, point of view. Where such an object oriented approach will lead, as it pur-
sues its novel course as neither a subjective idealism nor as a hard materialism, is hard 
to predict. In his article in this issue, Harman is keen to show that his object oriented 
approach is not only a powerful critical tool, as he presents a critique of Thomas Metz-
inger neuro-scientific materialist account of the self, but it can also offer an alternative. 
This is Harman’s long-term project, which he further develops in his forthcoming The 
Quadruple Object. 
Although there is a lot of interest in Harman’s work, speculative realism and OOO 
more generally, it has not entirely displaced the more relational theories, influenced by 
Deleuze. The work of Deleuze continues to be a rich resource for materialist/realist 
continental metaphysics, and was well represented amongst the papers at the confer-
ence. James Williams’ new article, written for this issue, argues for a Deleuzian defi-
nition of speculative thought and sketches an ambitious theory of objects, based on a 
complex reading of the interacting dimensions of time found in the temporal syntheses 
of Difference and Repetition. This highlights some of the fruitful connections that can be 
drawn between Deleuze and the contemporary work being developed under the banner 
of speculative realism.
Transcendental Materialism can best be described as a set of basic philosophical princi-
ples shared by a group of contemporary figures. The first commonality shared by those 
whose work could be considered Transcendental Materialism (hereafter TM) is a shared set 
of references that include German Idealism, Lacanian Psychoanalysis, and Marxist Ma-
terialism. One can find this triad in the work of Slavoj Žižek, Alain Badiou, Catherine 
Malabou, Adrian Johnston, and to a lesser extent, Quentin Meillassoux.5 It could be 
said that each of these thinkers begins with an axiom of Marxist, or Dialectical, Materi-
alism and then uses this axiom of Materialism to re-consider both German Idealism and 
Psychoanalysis, a method of interpretation most explicit in the works of Žižek. 
Another key principle for TM is the emphasis on a materialist account of the philo-
sophical subject. Whereas object centered approaches to metaphysics aims at a flat on-
tology, in which the human would be an object in the same way that a tree or a sneeze 
would be an object, TM argues for the exceptional nature of human subjectivity. What 
makes this emphasis on subjectivity markedly different from a return to an enlighten-
ment brand of humanism is that for this set of thinkers, subjectivity is not something 
based on any sort of metaphysical or spiritual hierarchy which places an absolute value 
on the human subject; instead, TM aims at providing an account of subjectivity in which 
     5. See in particular, Žižek, The Ticklish Subject, London, Verso, 2000 and The Parallax View, Cambridge, 
MIT Press, 2006; Badiou, Theory of  the Subject, London, Continuum, 2009 and Logics of  Worlds, London, 
Continuum, 2009; Malabou, The Future of  Hegel, London, Routledge, 2004 and What Should We Do With 
Our Brain?, New York, Fordham University Press, 2008; Johnston, Žižek’s Ontology, Chicago, Northwestern 
University Press, 2008 and Badiou, Žižek and Political Transformations: The Cadence of  Change, Chicago, North-
western University Press, 2009; Meillassoux, After Finitude, London, Continuum, 2008.
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a more-than-material subject is the product of a primarily material phenomenon. At 
this point TM utilizes the language of Lacanian Psychoanalysis to develop this account 
of materialist subjectivity, as exemplified by Johnston:
The break induced by the more-than-material subject splitting off from its 
material origins is irreplaceable, opening up an impossible-to-close gap, a non-
dialecticizable parallax split. The transcendental materialist theory of the subject 
is materialist insofar as it asserts that the Ideal of subjective thought arises from the 
Real of objective being, although it is also simultaneously transcendental insofar 
as it maintains that this thus-generated Ideal subjectivity thereafter achieves 
independence from the ground of its material sources and thereby starts to function 
as a set of possibility conditions for forms of reality irreducible to explanatory 
discourses allied to traditional versions of materialism.6
This account of the emergence of subjectivity is not only dialectical in-so-much as there 
is a dialectical, and irrevocable, split between subject and object, but also in the sense 
that it offers a dialectical theory of the mind itself. Thus freedom is dependent on the 
manner in which this dialectical structure goes ‘all the way down’, and subjectivity is the 
very freedom operating within these ‘gaps’. As Malabou has recently claimed, ‘a rea-
sonable materialism, in my view, would posit that the natural contradicts itself and that 
thought is the fruit of this contradiction’.7 Thus the internal freedom of individual con-
sciousness is an effect of the dialectical structure of the brain itself.
The final principle which characterizes TM, and equally provides a further distinc-
tion between this position and more object centered accounts, is an emphasis on the 
necessarily political nature of subjectivity. Something that is well known about the work 
of Badiou, Žižek, Malabou and Johnston is the manner in which each of their work 
draws a connection between materiality, subjectivity, and radical politics. One of the 
most interesting examples of this can be seen in Malabou’s concise work, What Should 
We Do with Our Brain? In this work, Malabou uses the concept of plasticity that was cen-
tral to her interpretation of Hegel to consider the plasticity inherent to the function of 
the brain. When discussing this connection between neuroscience and Marxist politics 
Malabou states that:
To produce consciousness of the brain is not to interrupt the identity of brain and 
world and their mutual speculative relation; it is just the opposite, to emphasize 
them and to place scientific discovery at the service of an emancipatory political 
understanding.8
Thus, one of the striking aspects of TM is the manner in which it attempts to explain the 
full range of subjective freedom from the dialectical workings of neuronal structure in 
individual brains all the way to the collective activity of radical politics. This necessary 
political connection, however, also raises problems for those hesitant to speak of such 
thing as ‘political ontology’ and any claim of necessary connection between the ontolog-
     6. Adrian Johnston, Žižek’s Ontology, Chicago, Northwestern University Press, 2008, p. 275.
     7. Malabou, What Should we do With Our Brain?, p. 82.
     8. Malabou, What Should we do With Our Brain?, p. 53.
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ical and political. Along with this worry that many of the thinkers associated with TM 
run the risk of sneaking pre-established political principles into a supposedly materialist 
consideration of ontological and subjective structure, those working with an emphasis 
on object oriented approaches to contemporary metaphysics will be skeptical about the 
necessarily human-centered approach to philosophy evident in TM. 
The following articles are roughly split along these two lines, reflecting the approach 
of an object oriented philosophy, or, more generally, a concern with real objects, and 
the complementary concerns of transcendental materialism, or, again, more broadly, a 
focus on material subjects. Opening with Graham Harman’s critical analysis of Metz-
inger’s monumental work Being No One. Here Harman seeks to highlight Metzinger’s 
implicit human bias, while being sympathetic to his intricate philosophical use of con-
temporary neuroscience. Harman offers his own object oriented approach as a more 
receptive and productive philosophy to deal with the in-human dimensions revealed 
by this advancing scientific discipline. Paul J. Ennis explores the transcendental core of 
correlationism, which he sees exemplified not only in the work of Kant but also Husserl. 
Understanding the transcendental core that runs through Meillassoux’s conception of 
correlationism provides a platform for better understanding his positive project, which 
is only hinted at in After Finitude. Mike Olson places Kant centre stage, arguing for a 
deeper appreciation of the foundational questions raised by his critical works, warning 
against a dogmatic appropriation of Kant as simply a figure to be overcome. James Wil-
liams offers a new reading of Deleuze, placing him in dialogue with the contemporary 
strands of speculative realism. Here Williams offers a Deleuzian definition of speculative 
philosophy, whilst engaging in complex analysis of the interacting dimensions and syn-
theses of time found in Difference and Repetition to present an initial sketch of a relational 
theory of real objects.
Moving away from the theme of real objects, towards that of material subjectivity, 
Austin Schmidt demonstrates why a revival of interest in Sartre forms a significant part 
of the new speculative landscape. In his essay Schmidt wants to emphasize the latent 
potential of Sartre’s original conception of imagination, developed in The Psychology of  
the Imagination, which is still at work in the Critique of  Dialectical Reason. Colby Dickinson 
looks toward a material, or animal, notion of subjectivity found in the work of Agam-
ben, where the division between human, animal and the divine becomes blurred. Peter 
Hallward offers the most explicitly political contribution in his analysis of the function 
of political will in the work of Frantz Fanon. John Van Houdt brings Hegel into dia-
logue with Quentin Meillassoux through an investigation of each philosopher’s theori-
zation of necessity and contingency, particularly in relation to the subject. Ryan Krahn 
argues for a reading of Hegel in which the Aufhebung itself has a dialectical structure, 
and through this reading manages to cut through the standard contemporary readings 
of Hegel to offer a properly twenty-first century Hegelianism. Tom Eyers’ piece investi-
gates the brand of Lacanian materialism which underlies the Transcendental Material-
ism of both Adrian Johnston and Slavoj Žižek, paying particular attention to the status 
of the Real in a truly materialist understanding of Lacan. Finally, we end with an in-
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terview with Adrian Johnston that includes both critical questions regarding his recent 
work as well as some insights into his current project. 
